Vem behöver en historielektion?

Intresset för andra världskriget är i stigande. Mycket av det som skrivs är vilseledande därför är det bra att Nyhetsbanken publicerar Michael Jabara Carleys utmärkta artikel. Men Carley har fel när han skriver att Stalin ”…ignorerade sin egen militära underrättelsetjänsts varning för en nazistisk invasion av Sovjetunionen. Han trodde att Hitler inte skulle vara så dum att han invaderade Sovjetunionen medan Storbritannien fortfarande var en krigförande makt. Så fel han hade.”. 
Georgij Zjukov argumenterar i sin självbiografi att Sovjetunionen både produktionsmässigt och militärt i själva verket var bra förberedd för krig och Röda armén väsentligen var mobiliserad vid tiden för den tyska attacken. Han tillbakavisar även Chrusjtjovs saga om att Stalin blev helt psykiskt knäckt vid det tyska anfallet och var borta från ledningen i flera veckor. Stalin var i selen från första stund men Zhukov hade aldrig sett Stalin så nedstämd som då. Det är väl inte att undra på då han visste – liksom många i den sovjetiska medborgare – att nazisterna skulle föra ett fruktansvärd terroristiskt förintelsekrig. Enligt Zhukov tog Stalin miste på huvudriktningen för den tyska attacken. Stalin uppfattning var att den ha sin koncentration mot södra Sovjetunionen, genom Ukraina mot Kaukasus med oljan råmaterialrikedomarna. Det visade sig att den tyska huvudstöten riktades mot Moskva och Leningrad.
Jan Myrdal skriver i senaste Folket i Bild/Kulturfront om den sovjetiska försvaret av Moskva och vikten av att inte sätta in de strategiska reserverna för tidigt. I det sammanhanget bör det påpekas att vikten av att Sovjet besegrade Japan 1939 då de snare försökte ockupera Mongoliet. Japan som invaderat den kinesiska provinsen Manchuriet i september 1931 den och etablerade marionett stat där. Japan började att försöka att från Manchuriet invadera Mongoliet i maj 1939. Den japanska krigshären stoppades sommaren 1939 av en kombinerad styrka ur Röda armén och mongoliska styrkor – under Zhukos ledning – som krossade Japans 6. armé i gränsstrider vid Mongoliet.  Striderna avslutades den 16 september 1939. Detta nederlag stoppade Japans framstöt i Sibirien och var huvudorsaken att den japanska statsledningen skrev på ett femårigt neutralitetsfördrag med Sovjet i Moskva den 13 april 1941 alltså bara 38 dagar innan det tyska anfallet. Sovjet behövde då inte utkämpa ett förödande tvåfrontskrig och kunde på så sätt behålla stora reserver långt i öster. Det blev avgörande för andra världskrigets förlopp.

Historielektion ????

Just nu när det händer väldigt otäcka saker i Persiska Viken?
Varför så tysta när det är på randen att starta nytt krig i Mellanöstern mellan de två största makterna Iran och Saudi Arabien?
Vakna Global Politics, det här är något allvarligt på gång!

Två förödande drönarattacker mot oljeanläggningar i Saudi Arabien. Allt i stora eldhav.
Men inga rapporter om antal döda och skadade? Är man mindre värd för man råkar jobba på ett oljeraffinaderi i Saudi Arabien?

HISTORIA ÄR ATT LÄGGA PUSSEL. MAN SÄGER ATT SEGRAREN SKRIVER
HISTORIEN OCH ATT HISTORIA ÄR DE LÖGNER VI, SEGRARNA, KOMMER
ÖVERENS OM. HÄR ÄR YTTERLIGGARE PUSSELBITAR SOM JAG TIDIGARE
ALDRIG HÖRT TALAS OM I MSM ELLER AV SOVJETEXPERTER. JAG KAN
INTE BEDÖMA DESSA MEN TYCKER ATT DET ÄR VIKTIGT ATT ALLA
FAKTA KOMMER FRAM.

VIKTOR SUVOROV F.D. ÖVERSTE I SOVJETS MILITRA UNDERRÄTTELSETJÄNST GER EN HELT ANNAN BAKGRUNDSFÖRKLARING
TILL HITLERS ANGREPP PÅ SOVJET, OPERATION BARABOSSA.

The Icebreaker was first published in the early 1990s . The book created a sensation in the military, academic community in the West for its polemical content. Author , a former GRU colonel who defected to the West, known for his virulent anti-communism.

Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, according to Suvorov, considered war as the mother of revolution. He realized than anyone else that war is won by the side which enters last and not by one who initiates it. Let enemies fight and exhaust themselves to the greatest extent possible then we would step in and reap the fruits. Stalin tried to realize Lenin’s unfinished agenda. Hitler served as a tool ( Icebreaker) to destroy Europe which Soviets later planned to seize.

However Wehrmacht’s sweeping victory against France and Low Countries in the summer of 1940 which even confounded the expectations of German High Command knock bottom out of the strategy. Stalin desired Germans to mire down in a long drawn-out conflict in the West which did not materialize. Such a course of events would have worked to Soviet Union’s advantage.

I have read Viktor Suvorov’s trilogy ”Icebreaker, Day-M, and Last Republic” in Lithuanian translation. All of them are thought provoking and offer a challenge to all WWII historians to take another sober look at the facts. Suvorov bases his thesis on publically available sources (mostly Soviet). If his facts are confirmed, and it appears that they easily could be, then they prove that a crazy view of history is being taught younger generations. I find it hard to believe that this book is out of print (in English). They are really worth the few dollars to buy them. Serious western publishers should be interested in publishing them even if it is only for the purpose of making another point of view available to the new generation of historians and politicians. I think it is also relavant to understanding current events as well.
P.S. Since I wrote the above review two other follow on books ”Purge” and ”Suicide” have been published in Lithuanian. The arguments in support of his thesis are further supported by new evidence that has since been made available. ”Purge” is about Stalin’s execution of military officers just prior to WWII. Again the interpretation is based upon available sources but the conclusions are just as controversial. In the West Marshal Tuchachevsky is seen as a military genius that if listened to could have saved the USSR. In Suvorov’s book he is depicted as a brutal (to civilian populations that never would have followed him in a war to defend the homeland) military incompetant. His absence made it possible for able and less tainted officers like Zhukov to command in WWII. ”Suicide” is the last book in the series and repeats a bit from the previous books. All in all amazing reading and encourages one to research the topic on one’s own. Also makes me curious to know about the language background of western sholars responsible for the popular view of WWII?. How many of the influential ones could read russian and access russian historical material about the war? How many were not duped by propaganda like the writer Bernard Shaw was when he visited the Ukraine in the 30’s and said there was no famine?

Exposing Stalin’s Plan to Conquer Europe 
How the Soviet Union ’Lost’ the Second World War

https://www.counter-currents.com/2011/04/exposing-stalins-plan-to-conquer-europe/

ANTONY SUTTON VISAR HUR BÅDE SOVJET OCH TYSKLAND BYGGDES UPP MED BANKKAPITAL FRÅN VÄST. ÄVEN UNDER DET ”KALLA KRIGET”.

RELATED TITLES
Antony C. Sutton and Viktor Suvorov on Technology
Transfer from the West to the Soviet Union
– Peter Myers,
October 14, 2003; December 29, 2004. Write to me at
mailto:
.
My comments are shown {thus}.
You are at http://users.cyberone.com.au/myers/sutton.html.
The USSR’s space technology was first-rate; but the Soviet space program was a development from the German V2.
Prior to the start of the Korean War, each side had talked of ”liberating” the other. Stalin, at Kim Il-Sung’s request, gave 100 T-34 tanks to North Korea; these formed the spearhead of its attack. But the Soviet T-34 tank was a development from a Christie tank sold to the Soviet Union by the United States.
Exploring this theme: volumes 3 and 2 of Antony C. Sutton’s trilogy
Western Technology and Soviet 
 Economic Development volume 3: 1945 to 1965
volume 2: 1930 to 1945
plus Viktor Suvorov,
 Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?
 
see item 4 ”Case studies: Tanks and the Space Technology”.
(1) Sutton’s Conclusions to his Trilogy (2) Sutton’s summary of his trilogy in
 National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union
(3) Assessment of Sutton’s Argument in his
Trilogy (4) Case studies: Tanks and the Space Technology (5) Sutton on the Bank for International Settlements (6) Eustace Mullins interview on Sutton (7) Soviet spies steal a Trojan Horse – causing a gas explosion; KGB Veteran Denies CIA Caused ’82 Blast
(8) Antony Sutton on Red Symphony and Hitler’s Secret Backers
(9) Sutton’s Laissez- Faire Ideology (10) Sutton infers Convergence / Synthesis (11) Sutton on Rakovsky and Trotsky (12) Sutton on ”Sidney Warburg” and the authorship of Hitler’s Secret Backers
(13) Antony C. Sutton on the state – the neutral/spectator view
(1) Sutton’s Conclusions to his Trilogy
 
Antony C. Sutton,
Western Technology and Soviet
 Economic Development 1945 to 1965
(Hoover Institution Press,
Stanford University, Stanford Ca., 1973).
{p. 411} CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE
Conclusions
EMPIRICAL CONCLUSIONS: 1917 TO 1930

The first volume of this study concluded that the Soviets employed more than 350 foreign concessions during the 1920s . These concessions, introduced into the Soviet Union under Lenin’s New Economic Policy, enabled foreign entrepreneurs to establish business operations in the Soviet Union without
gaining property rights
.The Soviet intent was to introduce foreign capital and skills, and the objective was to establish concessions in all sectors of the economy and thereby introduce Western techniques into the dormant postrevolutionary Russian economy. The foreign entrepreneur hoped to make a normal business profit in these operations. Three types of concessions were isolated: Type I, pure concessions; Type II, mixed concessions; Type III, technical-assistance agreements. Information was acquired onabout 70 percent of those actually placed in operation. It was found that concessions were employed within all sectors of the economy except one (furniture and fittings), although the largest single group of concessions was in raw materials development.
Inthe Caucasus oil fields- then seen as the key to economic recovery by virtue of the foreign exchange that oil exports would generate -the International Barnsdall Corporation introduced American rotary drilling techniques and pumping technology. By the end of the 1920s 80 percent of Soviet oil drilling was conducted by the American rotary technique; there had been no rotarydrilling at all in Russia at thetime of the Revolution. International Barnsdall also introduced a technical revolution inoil pumping and electrification of oil fields. All refineries were built by foreign
corporations , although only one, the Standard Oil lease at Batum, was under a concessionary arrangement – the remainder were built under contract.
Numerous Type I and Type III technical-assistance concessions were granted in the coal, anthracite, and mining industries , including the largest concession, that of Lena Goldfields, Ltd., which operated some 13 distinct and widely separated industrial complexes by the late 1920s. In sectors such as iron and steel, and particularly in the machinery and electrical equipment manufacturing sectors, numerous agreements were made between trusts and larger individual Tsarist-era plants and Western companies to start ulp and reequip the plants with the latest in Western technology. p. 412}
A.E.G., General Electric. and Metropolitan-Vickers were the major operators in
the machinery sectors . Only in the agricultural sector was the concession a failure. After information had been acquired on as many such concessions and technical- assistance agreements as possible, the economy was divided into 44 sectors and the impact of concessions and foreign technical assistance in each sector was analyzed. It was found that about two-thirds of the sectors received Type I and Type 11 concessions,
while over four-fitths received technical-assistance agreemnts with foreign companies.
A summary statement of this assistance, irrespective of the types of concession, revealed that all sectors except one, i.e., 43 sectors of a total of 44, had received some form of concession agreement. In other words, in only one sector was there no evidence of Western technological assistance received at some point during the 1920s. The agreements were made either with dominant trusts or with larger individual plants, but as each sector at the outset comprised only a few large units bequeathed by the Tsarist
industrial structure, it was found that the skills transferred were easily diffused
within a sector and then supplemented by imported equipment. Examination of reports by Western engineers concerning individual plants confirmed that restarting after the Revolution and technical progress during the decade were dependent on Western assistance.
It was therefore concluded that the technical transfer aspect of the New Economic Policy was successful. It enabled foreign entrepreneurs and firms to enter the Soviet Union. From a production of almost zero in 1922 there was a recovery to pre-World War I production figures by 1928. There is no question that the turn-around in Soviet economic fortunes in 1922 is to be linked to German technical assistance, particularly that forthcoming after the Treaty of Rapallo in April 1922 (although this
assistance was foreseeable as early as 1917 when the Germans financed the
Revolution). It was also determined that the forerunners of Soviet trading companies abroad – i.e., the joint trading firms -were largely established with the assistance of sympathetic Western businessmen.
. After the initial contacts were made, these joint trading firms disappeared, to be replaced by Soviet-operated units such as Amtorg in the United States and Arcos in the United Kingdom.
It was concluded that for the period 1917 to 1930 Western assistance in various forms was the single most important factor first in the sheer survival of the Soviet regime and secondly in industrial progress to prerevolutionary levels.
EMPIRICAL CONCLUSIONS: 1930 TO 1945
Most of the 350 toreigll concessions ot the 1920s had been liquidated by 1930. Only those entrepreneurs with political sicnificance for the Soviets received p. 413} compensation, but for those few that did (for example, Hammer and Harriman), the compensation was reasonable.
The concession was replaced by the technical-assistance agreement
, which together with imports of foreign equipment and its subsequent standardization and duplication, constituted the principal means of development during the period 1930
to 1945.
The general design and supervision of construction, and much of the supply of equipment for the gigantic plants built between 1929 and 1933
was provided by AlbertKahn, Inc., of Detroit , the then most famous of U.S. industrial architectural firm. No large unit of the construction program in those years was without foreign technical assistance, and because Soviet machine tool production then was limited to the most elementary types, all production equipment in these plants was foreign. Soviet sources indicate that
300,000 high-quality foreign machine tools were imported between 1929 and 1940. These machine tools were supplemented by complete industrial plants: for example, the Soviet Union received three tractor plants (which
also doubled as tank producers) , two giant machine-building plants Kramatorsk and Uralmash), three major automobile plants, numerous oil refining units, aircraft plants,and tube mills.Published data on the Soviet ”Plans” neglect to mentiona fundamental feature of the Soviet industrial structure in this period: the giant units were built by foreign

ANTONY SUTTON

https://sv.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antony_C._Sutton

https://www.amazon.com/Antony-C.-Sutton/e/B001K1S1ZE

http://www.reformation.org/antony-sutton-bio.html

Overview
Though he was a prolific author, Professor Sutton will always be remembered by his great trilogy: Wall St. and the Bolshevik Revolution, Wall St. and the Rise of Hitler, and Wall St. and FDR.
This is a trilogy describing the role of the American corporate socialists, otherwise known as the Wall Street financial elite or the Eastern Liberal Establishment, in three significant twentieth-century historical events: the 1917 Lenin-Trotsky Revolution in Russia, the 1933 election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States, and the 1933 seizure of power by Adolf Hitler in Germany.
Each of these events introduced some variant of socialism into a major country — i.e., Bolshevik socialism in Russia, New Deal socialism in the United States, and National socialism in Germany.
Contemporary academic histories, with perhaps the sole exception of Carroll Quigley’s Tragedy And Hope, ignore this evidence. On the other hand, it is understandable that universities and research organizations, dependent on financial aid from foundations that are controlled by this same New York financial elite, would hardly want to support and to publish research on these aspects of international politics. The bravest of trustees is unlikely to bite the hand that feeds his organization.
It is also eminently clear from the evidence in this trilogy that ”public-spirited businessmen” do not journey to Washington as lobbyists and administrators in order to serve the United States. They are in Washington to serve their own profit-maximizing interests. Their purpose is not to further a competitive, free-market economy, but to manipulate a politicized regime, call it what you will, to their own advantage.
Periodic crises and wars are used to whip up support for other plunder-reward cycles which in effect tighten the noose around our individual liberties. And of course we have hordes of academic sponges, amoral businessmen, and just plain hangers-on, to act as non-productive recipients for the plunder.
Stop the circle of plunder and immoral reward and elitist structures collapse. But not until a majority finds the moral courage and the internal fortitude to reject the something-for-nothing con game and replace it by voluntary associations, voluntary communes, or local rule and decentralized societies, will the killing and the plunder cease.